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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME IX DECEMBER, 1934 NUMBER 4
CONDITIONAL SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES*
WILLIxi F STnA
NOTICE, FILING AND RECORDATiON
In order for either type of instrument to be valid except as be-
tween the parties, or those with actual notice, the instrument must
be filed.
Actual notice is, of course, sufficient without filing, as to pur-
chasers and encumbrancers and subsequent creditors, and where
a bill of sale recited "subject to a first mortgage of $12,300" this
was held sufficient notice of a conditional sale where the balance
due was the same amount.5 '
An exception to the rule requiring filing exists in the case of a
conditional sale made in a state where filing is not required, and the
property moved into the State of Washington without the consent
of the vendor.
5 2
A conditional sale contract must be filed within ten days of the
delivery of possession of the chattels, in the county of the resi-
dence of the vendee."" Where the vendee is a corporation, it must
* Continued from last issue.
liMerrtclk v. Neeley., 143 Wash. 588, 255 Pac. 936 (1927) Wittler Cor-
bin Mach. Co. v. Martin, 47 Wash. 123, 91 Pac. 629 (1907). See also Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Ellensburga, 108 Wash. 533, 185 Pac. 811 (1919).5 3Rodecker v. ,annah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923). See also
note 43, supra. See also Sound Ind. Loan Co.. v. AZlyn, 149 Wash. 123,
270 Pac. 295 (1928), where court said if vendor consents to removal or
delays too long in complying with the laws of Washington after knowl-
edge of removal, the title is lost except as between the parties.
5 Rem. Revised Stats., Sec. 3790, as amended 1933: That all condi-
tional sales of personal property, or leases thereof, containing a condi-
tional right to purchase, where the property is placed in the possession
of the vendee, shall be absolute as to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees,
mortgagees, encumbrancers and subsequent creditors, whether or not such
creditors have or claim a lien upon such property, unless within ten days
after the taking of possession by the vendee, a memorandum of such
'sale, stating its terms and conditions and signed by the vendor and
vendee, shall be filed in the county auditor's office of the county, wherein,
at the date of the vendee's taking possession of the property, the vendee
resides. Every such contract for the conditional sale or lease of any
personal property, except machinery, apparatus or equipment to be used
in manufacturing or industrial purposes, attached to or to be attached
to a building, whether a fixture at common law or not, shall be absolute
as to all subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of such building and
the land on which it stands, unless such contract or lease shall also
,contain a sufficienet legal description of the real estate which said
-building occupies and shall be filed and recorded as provided In sec. 3791
of this act.
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be filed in the county designated as its headquarters by its articles
of incorporation.5 and not in the county where the chattel is to
be kept or used as in the case of a chattel mortgage, nor yet in the
county where in fact its principal business is transacted unless
that is the county designated in its articles of incorporation. 5
As revised in 1933, the statute provides for the recordation of a
conditional sale of property (except machinery, etc. in a plant)
where it is to be attached to real property, whether a fixture at
common law or not, and this record is to be made where an instru-
ment affecting such real property would be filed for record. In
the case of a corporation-vendee, this would modify the above state-
ments. In a case decided the same year under the former statute
which contained no such provision, the court avoided the con-
structive notice arising from the filing of a conditional sale of prop-
erty which was installed in a residence to be sold as a furnished
home, on the grounds that the vendee had an implied power of sale
to sell the furniture and equipment with the residence.58
The statute makes no provision for renewing the record and the
writer has found no case which would indicate whether it would
operate to give constructive notice indefinitely, or whether the
statute of limitations relating to contracts or the one relating to
recovery of personal property would be applied to a vendor's ac-
tion to recover the chattel, or if either applies, when it would com-
mence to run.
An assignment of the vendor's interest as security may be filed
and the filing will constitute constructive notice to creditors, sub-
sequent purchasers and encumbrancers.5 7 But if the assignment
is absolute and not given as security, there is no provision for fil-
ing, and filing does not operate as constructive notice.18
A third party dealing with the chattel is charged with the knowl-
edge he would have obtained in prosecuting inquiries suggested by
the filing. Thus an engine was sold under a contract inaccurately
describing it, and stating that it was to be filed in W County, in
fact it was never taken there but was installed in another county,
the contract was filed in a third county which was the residence of
Casey Hedges Co. v. Wilcox, 72 Wash. 605, 131 Pac. 205 (1913).
'Buckner-Weatherby Co. v. Wuest, 167 Wash. 647, 9 Pac. (2d) 1104
(1932).
58 Shoenfield v. Wilson, 175 Wash. 201, 27 Pac. (2d) 564 (1933).
Rem. Rev Stats. 3791-1.
'Flynn v. G(arfor4 Motor Truck Co., 149 Wash. 264, 270 Pac. 806
(1928). Though the assignment is absolute in form, it may be shown
to be for security only. Thayer v. Yaksma Tire Co., 116 Wash. 299, 199
Pac. 234 (1921). See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Arthur
118 Wash. 593, 204 Pac. 194 (1922).
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the corporation, it was held sufficient notice, because the vendee
at no time had any other engine of that character. 59 In another
case, upholding a contract which described a car number as 2076
when it should have been 2070, the court said, "It is not.necessary
that the description should he such as to identify the property
without the aid of parol evidence. " 60 With this liberality in re-
gard to description, compare the precision required in the matter
of the signature, in Jenrngs v. Schwartz the opening clause of
the contract recited the vendor's name, but he neglected to sign
the contract, and the court said that the record must be complete
without reference to extrinsic matters affecting the rights of the
parties.8 1
Filing must be within ten days of possession. But where on
delivery of the principal parts of a machine, substantial parts were
missing, and these were delivered within a reasonable time, and the
contract was then filed within ten days, there being no evidence of
bad faith, it was held that the filing was within time.2 And where
the conditional vendor had acquired title under a foreclosure sale,
and made no attempt to take possession pending negotiations to
sell it to the party in whose possession it remained, the contract
which was filed within ten days after the sale was made was held
to be valid as against creditors. 6s But where the agreement was to
execute the contract when the machine was in running order, which
because of difficulties required several months, it was held that a
contract fied within ten days thereafter was invalid as to general
creditors.64 The record must recite the truth to constitute con-
structive notice, thus where the contract recited that the goods for
equipping an apartment house were all delivered November 21st,
and it was filed January 11th following, the vendor was not pro-
tected as against the owner of the apartment house who paid the
vendee for the equipment after the filing, even as to that portion
of the goods which were actually delivered within ten days of the
date of filing.65
"'Wittler Corbin Mach. Co. v. Martin, note 51, supra.
w MacCallum Donahue Fin. Co. v. Warren, 122 Wash. 176, 210 Pac. 368
(1922). See also Diamond Iron Works case, 135 Wash. 228, 237 Pac. 313
(1925), where the contract referred to "plans and specifications."
"Note 18, supra.8 Anderson i,. Langford, 91 Wash. 176, 157 Pac. 456 (1916). In ac-
cord: Mentzner v. Commercial Lbr Co., 110 Wash. 155, 188 Pac. 9 (1920).
"Lundquist 'v. Olympna Nat. Bk., 133 Wash. 600, 234 Pac. 453 (1925).
"National Bread Wrapnng Co. v. Crowi, 137 Wash. 621, 243 Pac.
840 (1926).
Grunba m, Bros. Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Inv. Co., 144 Wash.
620, 258 Pac. 517 (1927).
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A former statute was construed to protect only such creditors as
had acquired some form of lien on the property, hence not protect-
ing a receiver who represented general unsecured creditors68 fol-
lowing the construction of the statute for filing chattel mortgages."7
But the present statutes, both as to conditional sales68 and as to
chattel mortgages,69 now read, "whether or not such creditors have
or claim a lien upon such property " The statute, of course, pro-
tects purchasers and encumbrancers in good faith for a valuable
consideration. A pre-existing debt is valuable consideration."0
Filing the contract after the lapse of the ten days does not make it
notice even to creditors who extended credit after it was filed.71
The filing of a conditional sale is for the protection of the vendor
only, and the vendor, if left in possession, may, under the doctrine
of retention of possession, pass good title to a third party, free of
the vendee's interest.7 2
Where the vendee under an unrecorded conditional sale, made
an outright sale to a third party, since the latter was protected by
the failure to file, he was not allowed to rescind his own contract
on the grounds that his vendor did not have title.73 Thus the con-
ditional vendee himself seems to have gained some benefit from the
failure to record.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides for filing in the
county where the chattel is to be kept, rather than in the county of
the residence of the vendee, and also provides for re-filing upon
removal of the chattel to a new county within ten days after the
vendor has received notice of such removal. It also limits the life
of the filing to three years, but provides refiling within the period
Rem & Bal. Code, 370. Malmo v. Washzngton Rendering & Fertil-
izer Co., 79 Wash. 534, 140 Pac. 569 (1914).
"Heal v. Evans Creek Coal & Coke Co., 71 Wash. 225, 128 Pac. 211
(1912).
" Note 53, supra. Only subsequent creditors are protected. A mortga-
gee with a mortgage covering after acquired property can not take advan-
tage of a subsequent conditional sale which was not filed. Bornstezn v.
Allen, 127 Wash. 314, 220 Pac. 801 (1923) Pratt v. Scand. Am. Bank,
103, Wash. 134, 174 Pac. 462 (1918).
"'Note 75, snfra.
70 Johnston v. Wood, 19 Wash. 441, 53 Pac. 707 (1898) Worley v. Met.
Motor Car Co., Inc., note 15, supra. Long v. McAvoy, note 27, supra;
Lee Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gray, 164 Wash. 569, 4 Pac. (2d) 503 (1931).
7"Am. Multigraph Sales Co. v. Jones, note 15, supra. This case was
decided under the statute construed to protect only creditors who had
acquired a specific lien, but under the present statute (note 53, supra)
should apply equally to general creditors.
"Flynn v. Garford Motor Truck Co., note 58, supra, No. Western
Finance Co. v. Russell, 161 Wash. 389, 297 Pac. 186 (1931).
,3 Woods v. Mclvor 74 Wash. 359, 133 Pac. 590 (1913).
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for successive periods of one year, much as the Washington pro-
vision for chattel mortgages. 4
There are several statutes dealing with the filing of chattel mort-
gages. Rem. 3780 and 378175 refers to the original filing and pro-
vides that, m order to constitute constructive notice, it must con-
tam the mortgagor's affidavit of good faith, must be acknowledged,
and must be filed within ten days after it is executed, in the county
in which the chattel is situated. This contrasts with the conditional
sale, which is to be filed within ten days of delivery of possession,
and in the county of the vendee's residence, regardless of the loca-
tion of the chattel. The word situated is interpreted to mean where
by the terms of the mortgage, the chattel is to be kept. Thus, in
ease of a purchase money chattel mortgage, it should be filed not in
the county where the sale is made, and where the chattel literally is
situated, but in the county where the vendee-mortgagoy is expected
to keep it.7 6
In the case of a conditional sale, a memorandum of the sale must
be signed by both vendor and vendee; in the case of a mortgage,
it must be acknowledged by the mortgagor and must contain an
affidavit of good faith. Presumably the difference in the require-
ments is due to the fact that in the case of a conditional sale there
is a change of possession, itself a matter of some notoriety, whereas
Sees. 10, 11, 13.
Rem. Rev. Stats., Sec. 3780: A mortgage of personal property is void
against all creditors of the mortgagor, both existing and subsequent,
whether or not they have or claim a lien upon such property, and -against
all subsequent purchasers, pledgees, and mortgagees and encumbrancers
for value and In good faith, unless it is accompanied by the affidavit
of the mortgagor that it is made in good faith, and without any design
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and unless It is acknowledged and
filed within ten days from the time of the execution thereof in the office
of the county auditor of the county m which the mortgaged property
Is situated as provided by law.
Sec. 3781. Every such instrument within ten days from the time
of the execution thereof shall be filed in the office of the county auditor
of the county In which the mortgaged property is situated, and such
auditor shall file all such instruments when presented for the purpose,
upon the payment of proper fees therefor, indorse thereon the time of
reception, the number thereof, and shall enter in a suitable book to be
provided by him at the expense of his county, with an alphabetical index
thereto, used exclusively for that purpose, ruled into separate columns
with appropriate heads: "The time of filing," "Name of mortgagor,"
"Name of mortgagee, "Date of instrument," "Amount secured," "When
due," and "Date of release." An index to said book shall be kept in the
manner required for indexing deeds to real estate, and the county auditor
shall' receive for the services required by this act the sum of fifteen
cents for every instrument, and the moneys so collected shall be ac-
counted for as other fees of his office. Such instruments shall remain on
file for the inspection of the public.
"No. Pactfic Bank v. Pao. Mercantile Agency, 153 Wash. 37, 279 Pac.
103 (1929). For full statement of the case see note 78, tnfra.
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a mortgage may frequently be given where it is accompanied by no
outward sign and lends itself to the perpetration of a fraud upon
creditors of the mortgagor. It is interesting to note that the Uni-
form Chattel Mortgage Act requires neither acknowledgment nor
affidavit of good faith, and makes filing notice only from the time
of filing. Its draftsman, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, was able to
find no record of any mortgagor having been prosecuted for giving
a false affidavit, and the Act very sensibly punishes the giving of a
fraudulent mortgage rather than of a false affidavit. An acknowl-
edgment, however, if added, raises a presumption of due execu-
tion.
77
Both the conditional sale and the chattel mortgage, unless filed,
are invalid as to subsequent general creditors, purchasers, pledgees,
or encumbrances "bona fide" or "in good faith."
Rem. 3788 provides for refiling of a mortgage in another county
to which the chattel has been removed, within thirty days after
removal. In stating the classes of persons as to whom it is invalid
unless filed within that time, it omits the words "in good faith."
An rnference as to the effect of this omission may be drawn from
the case of Nort. Pacific Bank v. Pacific Mercantile Agency.7 B
bought a car from S in P County, the car to be kept in T County
S filed the purchase money chattel mortgage in P County but not
in T County X having actual notice of the mortgage, repaired the
car under an agreement giving him the right to possession until
he was paid. X relied on the failure to reord in T County It
was held that since the place for the original filing was T County,
Rem. 3789 applied, and X lost because he was not an encumbrancer
"in good faith," the filing in P County being of no effect what-
ever. However, the court implies that had Rem. 3788 applied, as
it would have had the mortgage required the car to be kept in P
County, then since the statute dealing with removals omits the
CCgood faith" provision, X could have held the car regardless of
his actual notice.
Where the chattel has been removed from the county where it
was to be kept, and the mortgagee fails to file within thirty days
of such removal a purchaser who buys before the expiration of
the thirty days, without actual notice of the mortgage, but know-
ing from which county it had been brought, is protected, although
he would not have been had it been filed subsequent to his purchase
71 Sec. 2, 8, 35.
,6 Note 76, supra.
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but before the thirty days elapsed.7 9 Although the implication from
these two cases would seem to be that one with notice might take
free of a mortgage not properly reified upon removal, it has been
held that one who accepts a mortgage upon the removed chattels,
expressly made subject to the former mortgage, cannot contest the
validity of the former mortgage, notwithstanding it was never re-
filed.80 However, such a mortgage is invalid as to a creditor levy-
ing on such chattels, although he had actual notice.8' But where
two mortgages were given to different parties and filed, but the
first mortgage was never reified after removal to a second county,
the second mortgagee, who knew of the first mortgage, was held
liable to the first mortgagee in conversion, where he sold the prop-
erty within the thirty days and applied the proceeds to the pay-
ment of his own mortgage.82
Even actual knowledge of a mortgage which is not acknowledged
does not make it valid as to a general creditbr of the mortgagor and
if such creditor takes a mortgage to secure his claim, his mortgage
is superior to the former mortgage.8 3
Rem. 3785 provides that a chattel mortgage for over $300 may be
recorded but it must also be filed and indexed as other chattel
mortgages.8"
Under Rem. 3782, the filing of a chattel mortgage ceases to be
constructive notice after two years to creditors of the mortgagor
and subsequent purchasers and eneumbrancers in good faith, un-
less the mortgagee files an affidavit as to the amount still due. Rem.
3783 provides for subsequent renewals at yearly intervals, by fiing
of the affidavit "before the time when any such mortgage would
otherwise cease to be valid as against such creditors and subse-
quent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith." The expression
"cease to be valid" was made the basis of a contention that unless
such affidavit were fied the mortgage ceased to be valid to a subse-
quent mortgagee with actual knowledge but the court very prop-
Muller v. Barshar 119 Wash. 252, 205 Pac. 845 (1922).
First Nat. Bank v. Northwest Motor Co., 108 Wash. 167, 183 Pac. 81'
(1919).
" Turner v. Caldwell, 15 Wash. 274 (1896).
82 S1chneiler 'v. Vincent, 131 Wash. 238. 229 Pae. 737 (1924). Affirmed
on rehearing, 135 Wash. 698, 237 Pac. 1119 (1925).
83Belcher v. Young, 90 Wash. 303, 155 Pac. 1060 (1916) Seaboard
Datry Cr Corp. v. Paulson, note 6, supra, Snith v. Allen, 78 Wash. 135,
138 Pac. 683 (1914). But in earlier cases see contra result: Hicks V. Nat'l
Surety Co., 50 Wash. 16, 96 Pac. 515. (1908) followed in Thomngs v. Grote-
IRankn Co., 75 Wash. 280, 134 Pac. 919 (1913).
"See First Nat. Bk. v. White Dulang Co., 121 Wash. 386, 209 Pac.
861 (1922). For a case holding recording alone is sufficient without filing,
under Rem & Ball. 3661, a former statute of similar purport, see Van
Wink e v. Mitchumr, 66 Wash. 296, 119 Pac. 748 (1911).
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erly rejected thins contention.8 5 The implication of Community
State Bank v. Martn86 would seem to be that if one converts the
chattel while the filing is still valid notice, the failure to refile
within two years does not protect him, his liability having been
complete when the conversion took place, although in that case the
action was started before the two years expired and only the trial
came later. If this is the proper implication, then the failure to
refile to renew a mortgage does not protect a converter, while the
implication of North Pacific Bank v. Mercantile Agency, supra, is
that the failure to refile in case of removal would do so.
It might be questioned whether a converter were within the
protection of the recording statutes. Were he always a deliberate
wrongdoer he should not be, but where, as in the Community State
Bank case, supra, he is a lessor who has sold a crop under a claim of
prior lien, and the question is whether he became a converter in
failing to pay the surplus, if any, to the mortgagee, it would seem
that he should be entitled to protection.
An interesting problem has been recurrently before the court
which involves the question of how far a purchaser from a regular
dealer, and in the ordinary course of business, is bound by the
constructive notice of a filed instrument.
In State Bank v. Johnson,8 7 the vendor sold a car to B, and as-
signed the contract to F as an outright sale of the contract ;88 B
becoming discouraged returned the car to the vendor who then sold
it to X as a second hand car. It was held that X took subject to
the rights of the assignee F The court said that, assuming but
not deciding that the filing of the contract to B did not operate
as constructive notice to X, still the vendor had sold a car it did
not own, and the principle of market overt did not obtain in this
country It is difficult to see how any other decision could be
reached.
In Gramm-Bernsten Motor. Truck Co. v. Todd,8 the dealer re-
ceived his cars under filed conditional sale contracts or chattel
mortgages, but letters indicated he was not expected to pay for
8 First State Bank v. McGregor Co., 141 Wash. 549, 251 Pac. 865, 51
A. L. R. 585 (1927). Farmers State Bank v. McCiuley, 133 Wash. 364,
233 Pac 661 (1925), applies the same construction and deals also with
a mortgage for future advances. Otheflo State Bank v. Case Threshng
Machmne Co., 113 Wash. 680, 194 Pac. 563 (1921). Cf. also 77 Wash. 115,
113 Wash. 680, 153 Wash. 37.
"144 Wash. 483, 258 Pac. 498 (1927).
81104 Wash. 550, 177 Pac. 340, 3 A. L. R. 235 (1918).
" Rem. 3791-1 provides for filing an assignment intended as security.
Note 57, supra.89 121 Wash. 145, 209 Pac. 3 (1930). See 5 Wash. Law Rev. 65 at p. 69.
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them until he had resold. It was held that purchasers from the
dealer were not bound by constructive notice.
But in Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle," where the dealer also
received Ins cars under filed chattel mortgages, it appeared that he
was authorized to sell but not deliver before he paid for them. It
was held, with two justices dissenting, that the purchaser from the
dealer was bound by constructive notice.
In Flynn v. Garford Motor. Truck Co.,91 the conditional vendee
left the truck m the possession of the vendor. The contract was
filed under Rem. 3790, 3791. The vendor sold the truck as his own
to the defendant. The original vendee, m whom title had vested
as a result of an action against hun for the full purchase price,
sued the defendant for conversion, and it was held that the de-
fendant took without constructive notice by the filing because the
statutes above mentioned gave protection to the vendor only and
not to a vendee who left the chattel in the possession of the vendor
who was able to pass good title under the doctrine of retention of
possession.
In Northwestern Finance Co. v. Russell,92 the dealer sold a car
to his salesman under a conditional sale which was duly filed. He
then assigned the contract to the plaintiff, and subsequently sold
the car to defendant who believed it to be a new car. The court
found for the defendant on the grounds that plaintiff was charge-
able with notice of the scheme for double financing and knew that
the car was kept on the sales floor of the dealer. The court also
commented on the fact that plaintiff still tried to collect from the
dealer and his salesman after knowledge of the sale to defendant.
In the last case of this character to come before the court, Com-
mercwZ Credit Co. v. Cutler,8 the dealer, who was the sole local
agent for that type of car, sold a car to his salesman, and the con-
ditional sale was filed. The contract was then assigned to plaintiff
who knew that the salesman was using the car as a demonstrator.
The salesman made the first payment to the plaintiff, but all sub-
sequent payments were made by the dealer. The dealer and his
salesman then sold the car to defendant who knew it was a demon-
strator and apparently received an extra allowance on his old car
1119 Wash. 169, 205 Pac. 382 (1922). See 5 Wash. Law Rev. 65 at
p. 68.
" Note 58, supra.
"Note 72, supra. Case note m 6 Wash. Law Rev. 174 (1931) indicates
that the Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 25, plus Sec. 76(2), which provides that
good faith means "honestly" whether negligent or not, would have set-
tled this case without discussion of comparative innocence.
"29 Pac. (2d) 686 (Wash. 1934).
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as a consequence. It was held that the filing constituted notice to
the defendant. A dissenting opinion by three justices stressed the
fact that a careful search of the records would have disclosed no
conditional sale to the dealer, and no chattel mortgage given by
him, and contended that there was no reason to search the records
for a conditional sale by the dealer, and pointed out that plaintiff
had lent itself to an arrangement calculated to injure an innocent
purchaser.
While it is difficult to draw from these cases a clear cut rule
for future guidance, it would appear that the court is looking at
the situation subjectively from the point of view of the holder of
such security instruments, rather than objectively from the posi-
tion of the innocent purchaser in the regular course of business,
and if the latter is protected from the operation of constructive
notice, it is only when the security holder has actually or impliedly
authorized a sale and delivery by the dealer, or with something ap-
proaching actual knowledge has participated in a fraudulent
scheme of financing.
The writer is impressed with the policy of the new Uniform
Trust Receipts Act which relieves the purchaser from a dealer in
the regular course of business from the effect of constructive notice
arising from the filing of a security instrument, whether the instru-
ment is filed under the Trust Receipts Act or any other act pro-
viding for the filing of such security instrument. 94
Notice should be taken of recent legislation relating to the filing
of certain security instruments. Under the new state policy with
regard to the registration of motor vehicles provision is made for
filing with the State Treasurer of encumbrances upon motor ve-
hicles and thus provides for a state record of the title to such
readily moveable property 95 Provision is also made for the filing
of chattel mortgages covering mixed personalty and realty in a
manner to give evidence of such encumbrance to one searching the
title to the realty involved.9 6 A somewhat similar provision relat-
ing to conditional sales has already been mentioned.
Thus it would appear that the requirements to give notice to the
11 Section 16: "As to any transaction falling within the provisions
both of this act and of any other act requiring filing or recording, the
entrustor shall not be required to comply with both, but by complying
with the provisions of either at his election may have the protection
given by the act complied with; except that buyers in the ordinary
course of trade as described in subsection 2 of Section 9, and lienors as
described in Section 11, shall be protected as therein provided, although
the compliance of the entrustor be with the filing or recording require-
ments of another act."
Laws of '33, Rem. 6311-5, 6311-7.
Rem. Rev. Stats. 15597, 10598.
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world of a conditional sale are less burdensome than in the case of
the chattel mortgage, where the failure to discover the removal of
the chattel within thirty days may result in the loss of the mort-
gagee's security This would suggest that the conditional sale de-
vice would be preferable from the vendor's viewpoint in the case
of a chattel readily moveable, unless in the particular case the ad-
vantage of having the vendee's unconditional obligation to pay a
defliceney judgment were sufficient to balance the scales in favor
of the mortgage.
RIGHTs, REHEDES AND IABnnms
By the great weight of authority in other states, the risk of loss
in the event of destruction without fault is placed upon the con-
ditional vendee, either on the ground that the vendor has fully per-
formed in delivering possession and the right to acquire title,9 7
or that the vendor like the chattel mortgagee under the title theory
of mortgages, retains the title for security only,98 or under Section
22 (a) of the Uniform Sales Act.9 Prior to the adoption of the
Sales Act in this state in 1925,10 the Supreme Court of Washngton
placed the risk of loss on the vendor, construing the contract strict-
ly as a sale upon condition.'0 ' Whether the effect of the Sales Act
will be to change the rule in this state cannot be said with cer-
tainty The court has shown a disposition to follow Professor Wil-
liston's interpretation of the Sales Act, and Ins interpretation
would place the risk of loss upon the conditional vendee.1 2 The
only case the writer has found construing Section 22 did not in-
volve a conditional sale.0 8 Ashford v. Reese,"'4 the companion case
to H lt v. Jaussaud,'05 applied to real property the same rule that
risk of loss is upon the conditional vendee. Since the Sales Act
would not affect the rule as to realty, the court might feel relucatnt
to find that the rule as to personality was necessarily changed. In
these famous cases rendered simultaneously the court expressed its
opinion vigorously that the conditional vendee has no interest,
I Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 So. 627, 14 A. S. R. 540 (1889).
Osborn v. South Shore Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 526, 65 N. W 184 (1895).
' O'Neil-Adam Co. v. Eklund, 89 Conn. 232, 93 Atl. 524, Ann. Cas.
1918D 379 (1915).
100Laws of 1925, Ch. 142; Ren. Rev. Stats. 5836-22 (a) Pierce Code,
6227-22 (a).
101 Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35, 38 A. L. R.
1312 (1925).
'12Williston on Sales, see. 304.
'03iland Seed Co. 'v. Idaho Seed Co., 160 Wash. 244, 294 Pac. 991
(1931).
10'Ashford, v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 19 (1925).O Note 101, supra. The language is better known but only slightly
stronger than that in earlier cases. See Peterson v. Chess, 92 Wash. 682,
159 Pac. 894 (1916).
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legal or equitable, in the subject matter of the sale. Subsequent
cases have substantially repudiated this language, but they did not
involve risk of loss. It has been held proper to contract that the
vendee shall bear the risk, but whether the Sales Act would place
it there was not discussed.
1 0 6
Much litigation has arisen in the hope that this generalization
meant something more than a mere allocation of risk of loss. Thus
far it has led only to disappointment. Hess v. Starwch,'10 7 while
repeating the language, held that the vendee had an interest which
could be attached, without undertaking to label the interest other-
wise. In Pratt v. Rhodes, 0 8 again reiterating this expression of
opinion, the court found that the conditional vendee of realty was
entitled to specific performance and was not to be relegated to an
action for damages only If further added that full performance
by the conditional vendee vested equitable title in him. In Western
Bond Co. v. Chester,109 while finding that no injury had resulted
from the omission, the court said that the jury should have been
instructed to limit the recovery of the vendor against a sheriff
who had wrongfully attached the chattel in an action against the
vendee, to the amount of the vendor's interest. In Seeley v. Pea-
body,"0 the vendor had wrongfully declared a forfeiture and seized
a herd of dairy cows, the vendee was permitted to recover their
value when seized, less the balance due on the contract, in an action
for conversion. If he had no property interest to sustain trover,
he must at least have had a right to possession, similar to the lessee
of a chattel, to support trespass on the case for conversion.
Finally in Knhn v. Ambrose,"' where the vendor's assignee re-
lied upon this dictum to support his contention that the vendee
108 Seaboard Sec. Co. v. Berg, note 30, supra. In Dysart v. Colonza2
Fire Underwriters, 142 Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927), the contract re-
quired the vendee to pay the premium on Insurance payable to both
as interests might appear. When fire destroyed the property the vendee
was not in default. Vendor declared forfeiture for subsequent default
in payment. Held: The vendor cannot declare forfeiture when he him-
self is unable to perform, besides the contingency (fire) provided for has
occurred. The vendor received only the balance due on his contract, the
remainder of the insurance going to the vendee, who thus suffered any
loss not covered by insurance. This decision places the risk of loss on
the vendee by contract, but the suggestion that the fire rendered the
vendor unable to perform suggests the theory that risk is on vendor, for
otherwise he had already fully performed.
"1149 Wash. 679, 272 Pac. 75 (1928). In Tope v. Brattain, 172 Wash.
556, 21 Pac. (2d) 241 (1933) it was held his interest could be mort-
gaged.11 142 Wash. 441, 253 Pac. 640, 256 Pac. 503 (1927).
10145 Wash. 81, 259 Pac. 13 (1927).
110 139 Wash. 382, 247 Pac. 471 (1926).
1" 171 Wash. 528, 18 Pac. (2d) 485 (1933).
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had no assignable interest, the court said, "We have, however, since
receded somewhat from that position and have later held that the
vendee does have some interest."
The mortgagee is entitled to payment regardless of the destruc-
tion of the chattel, because his obligation is unconditional. Both
the vendor and the mortgagee have an insurable interest.'1 2 Where
the contract required the vendee to insure, and the vendee insured
in the name of his own transferee, the conditional vendor could
collect from the insurance company, the court remarking that the
insurance company had knowledge or the means of obtaining the
knowledge as to the contract had it followed up the inquiries sug-
gested.11 3
The vendor's distinctive remedy is to forfeit the contract, on de-
fault by the vendee, and Ins right is not affiected by the fact that
the county has attached the chattel to collect taxes owed by the
vendee on other property 1" The court remarked that possibly the
county could have kept the contract alive by making payments.
His right to forfeit is not affected by the fact that creditors of the
vendee have attached the latter's interest, and the sheriff who
seizes such property acts at his peril if the vendor declares a for-
feiture. 51
Though the contract be not filed, the vendor may repossess the
chattel from a purchaser with knowledge, and the latter bears the
burden of proving good faith."6 Where an old cash register was
to form part of the consideration for a new one, the vendor was
allowed to recover the new one and was not limited to an action
to obtain possession of the old. 71 If the vendee's check is re-
turned unpaid for insufficient funds, the vendor may forfeit." 8
Where the vendee had fully completed the job for which he
bought the power shovel, but clanned substantial damages because
of delays for repairs, and after repossession by the vendor sued
the latter to recover what he had paid, the court in finding that the
forfeiture was proper and that an inequitable result had not been
reached, compared only the damages suffered by the vendee with
the rental value, although the rental value was considerably less
2 O'Neill v. Pac. St. Fire Ins. Co., 128 Wash. 133, 222 Pao. 215 (1923).
Quinn v. Parke, note 2, supra. Rem. Rev. Stats. 7033 -defines Insurable
Interest to Include every interest of such a nature that contemplated
peril mglht directly damnify the insured.
" Robbins v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173 Pac. 634 (1918).
Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Snohomssh Co., 160 Wash. 384, 295 Pac. 110 (1931).
"' Note 109, supra,
1Wittler Corb%n, Mach. Co., note 51, supra.
'TNat'l Cash. Reg. Co. v. Petsas, 43 Wash. 376, 86 Pac. 662 (1906).
' LiTiopoulos v. Ayerest, 125 Wash. 134, 215 Pac. 339 (1923).
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than the damages arising from delay and repairs plus the amount
paid on the contract.119 It would seem that where the defects are
not sufficient to entitle the vendee to rescission, he should at least
tender the full purchase price less the amount of his actual dam-
ages. The court has held that even after a declaration of forfeiture,
the vendee may acquire title by payment of the balance due plus
costs to date.120 A tender by the vendee conditioned upon clearing
the title to the chattel has been held to bar forfeiture.1'2 1 The vendor
may put himself in a position where by reason of the vendee's re-
liance upon him he is not justified in declaring a forfeiture. 122
The vendor's right of possession after forfeiture will support
replevin.12 1 But he may not retake the chattel without court action,
even with the aid of the police, unless it can be done without breach
of the peace. 2 4
The mortgagee cannot maintain replevin even though the mort-
gage gives him a right to possession after default ;125 but he may
do so if he is entitled to possession before default and it is wrong-
fully taken from him.126
The mortgagee's distinctive remedy is foreclosure. 2 ' The statute
provides for a rather summary mode of foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage; upon proper notice after the debt is due he may have
the property sold as upon execution on a judgment, without trial
or order of the court, but the mortgagor or any party interested in
contesting the mortgage may throw the case into the Superior
Court, and injunctive relief is provided for.128 The statute also
provides that if the mortgagee reasonably feels that his security is
irdperiled, he may accelerate the debt and if the debt is for a
liquidated amount without interest, he need not discount it because
of the acceleration. 29 Apparently a conditional vendor may pro-
C19ampbell v. Bucyrus-Erse Co., 172 Wash. 428, 20 Pac. (2d) 594
(1933).
'12Nat. Cash Reg. Co. v. Wapples, 52 Wash. 657, 101 Pat. 227 (1909).
Grennelle v. Boulass, note 3, supra.
' Seattle Auto Co. v. Essex, 138 Wash. 409, 244 Pac. 705 (1926)
Breaks v. Spokane Auto Co., 93 Wash. 143, 160 Pac. 291 (1916).
"Carabsn v. Wilhelm, 87 Wash. 52, 151 Pac. 87 (1915).
',Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 Pac. (2d) 33 (1932)
=Saywar v. Nunan, 6 Wash. 87, 32 Pac. 1022 (1893), and Spokane
See. Fin. Co. v. Crowley Lbr., 152 Wash. 697, 279 Pac. 103 (1929) approv-
ing Nettleton v. Evans, 67 Wash. 227, 121 Pac. 54 (1912), and expressly
overruling Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Gowan, 24 Wash. 66, 63 Pac. 1111
(1901).
'Burke v. Wilson, 107 Wash. 454, 181 Pac. 984 (1919).
Silsby v. Alcredge, 1 Wash. 117, 23 Pac. 836 (1890) Spokane Sec.
Fin. Co. v. Crowley Lbr Co., note 125, supra, Roche Fruit & Produce Co.
v. Vaught, 143 Wash. 601, 255 Pac. 953 (1927).
Rem. Rev. Stats. 1104-1110.
'"Rem. Rev. Stats. 1111 and 1112. Lee v. Walmsley, 136 Wash. 573,
240 Pac. 906 (1925).
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vide by contract for a similar acceleration. 130 The mortgagee, like
the conditional vendor, is not entitled to take direct action and
seize the chattel, except to the extent provided for in the statute
above mentioned.1"'
The conditional vendor may sue for the purchase money against
both the vendee and an assignee who assumed the contract, which
assumption may be implied, but he is not entitled to a lien aganst
the chattel even though he endeavors to assert any right of the
vendee, who is not in court, to have the chattel applied to the pay-
ment of the obligation."32
The mortgagor has legal title'"' and, like the conditional vendee,
the right to possession unless otherwise provided by contract." 4
While the vendee's possession may be taken from him by replevin
after default as indicated above, the mortgagor's may be taken only
by some form of foreclosure and sale.'3 5
Obviously the mortgagor has an insurable interest. The condi-
tional vendee has a similar interest. 86 In a decision allowing a
conditional vendee of realty to recover in full on a valued policy,
the court remarked that as to personalty there could be no recovery
in the absence of proof of special interest.'37
The mortgagor's interest, like that of the vendee, is subject to
attachment, but where the mortgagee is in possession, possession
cannot be taken from him by attachment, however, the mortgagee
may be garnished.3 8
Actions in conversion by the various parties to these instruments
have produced a considerable number of cases and some odd re-
sults.
The mortgagee may sue in conversion, the court remarking that
otherwise his security might be destroyed without remedy '3 9 His
"mRichardson v. Gt. Western Motors Co., 109 Wash. 324, 187 Pac. 333(1920).
231Schultz 'v. Wells Butchers Supply Co., 151 Wash. 382, 275 Pac. 737(1929) NJettleton v. Evans, note 125, supra. This is true even though
the mortgage provides mortgagee may take possession using necessary
force. McClellan v. Gaston, 18 Wash. 472, 51 Pac. 1062 (1898).
2'Nat. (r Co. v. Cascl. Co., 173 Wash. 275, 22 Pac. (2d) 670 (1933)
Roder v. Johnson, 148 Wash. 675, 270 Pac. 105 (1928).
'* Voorhtes v. Hennessy, 7 Wash. 243, 34 Pac. 931 (1893).S iSsby v. Aldredge, note 127, supra.
"' Raymond Bros. v. Thomas, note 39, supra, Spokane Sec. Fin, Co. v.
Crowley, note 125, supra.
121 Quinn v. Parke Lacey Mach. (o., note 2, supra; Wells Chevrolet Go.
'v. Pac. Fire Ins. Co., 161 Wash. 1, 296 Pac. 177 (1931).
" Brght v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 48 Wash. 60, 92 Pac. 779 (1907).
1= Wilson v. Montague, 57 Mich. 638, 24 N. W 851 (1885) Marsh v.
Wade, 1 Wash. 538, 20 Pac. 578 (1889).
"I' Spokane See. Fin. (o. v. (rowley, note 125, supra, German Am.
State Bank v. Seattle Grain Co., 89 Wash. 376, 154 Pac. 443 (1916)
Schnefler v. Vincent, note 82, supra.
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action is for the destruction of his lien.14 0 The conditional vendor
may also recover for conversion if he has declared a forfeiture and
is entitled to possession, and the court has suggested that his re-
covery should be limited to his interest, thus nnplymg that he oc-
cupies much the same position as the mortgagee.1 41 Under the
theory of forfeiture adhered to in this state the vendor after for-
feiture should be entitled to recover for the full value of the chat-
tel.
The conditional vendee may recover damages for an injury to
the car.4 Where he was not in default when the injury occurred,
he was allowed to recover even though- the vendor forfeited the
contract after the action was brought but before judgment. 43
The vendee in possession may recover in- conversion where he has
unconditionally promised to pay the full purchase price,'4 4 or
where title has vested in him by virtue of an action against him for
the full purchase price. 4 '
But the vendee may also recover the full value of the chattel in
an action for conversion although the contract is still forfeitable.
Where the vendee's lessee wrongfully seized the vendee's restau-
rant equipment, the defendant pleaded that it was encumbered by
chattel mortgages and conditional sales, but the vendee re-
covered.
46
Again, the vendee was in possession under a conditional sale
when the property was damaged. The vendor did not. elect to re-
possess. The vendee recovered full value on two possible grounds
there having been no forfeiture declared, the vendee was still liable
to the vendor for the full value, and the vendee in pdssession is
the same as a bailee and can recover full value from a tort feasor
regardless of the extent of his own interest.14 7
The most interesting case of this character was that of Burnett
v. Dunnga.148 The conditional vendee loaned his car to X to
make a certain trip. X exceeded his authority and went much
farther, and while doing so wrecked the car. He put it into a
garage for repairs. The vendee bought an action for conversion.
1 0 Ballen -v. Wilson Creek Unson Gramn Co., 90 Wash. 400, 156 Pac. 404
(1916).
laWestern Bou & Mortgage Co. v. Chester note 109, supra.
- Oros v. Allen, 133 Wash. 268, 233 Pac. 314 (1925).
113 Helf v. Hanson, 167 Wash. 206, 9 Pac. (2d) 110 (1932).
144 Messinger v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353, 74 Pac. 480 (1903).
1,5 Flynn v. Garford Motor Truck Co., note 58, supra.
'
4 5Demzr v. Sorrenson, 167 Wash. 363, 9 Pac. (2d) 383 (1932).
Stotts v. Puget Sound, P & L. Co., 94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917).
" 165 Wash. 164, 4 Pac. (2d) 829 (1931).
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Thereafter the vendor repossessed before- the vendee's case reached
court. Four justices held that the vendee could recover whether
the vendor's actions amounted to a forfeiture or not. Two justices
concurred on the ground that there had been no forfeiture. Three
justices dissented on the ground that the vendee should have been
permitted to recover only the value of his equity
The basis of the decision of the four justices would seem to work
a hardship. The vendor has the car; the vendee the full value. The
converter pays the value of the car, plus the cost of repairs, and
has nothing but experience. Exemplary damages, indeed!
The basis on which recovery is had m conversion is that of an
involuntary sale but the converter should get what he pays for.
The, only justification for permitting the vendee to recover the full
value is that of implied authority to sell the property and pass title.
The case is correct in its holding that no subsequent act of the
vendor should defeat recovery in the action already brought, but
the suggestion or nplicatom that the vendor might effectively
forfeit the contract after the action was brought rejects the only
basis on which it would seem that the action of the vendee could
be sustained."4 9 But the case has been cited and followed m the
S" The view elsewhere would seem to be that the vendee in possession
at the time the chattel is damaged or converted has an implied authority
to bind the vendor by his action. The conditional vendee may recover
full damages even though he is in default at the time of the taking, and
the vendor is thereby barred. Lord v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320, 37 Atl. 1048,
60 A. S. R. 933 (1897). He may maintain trover after default and. even
after the vendor has made a demand on the converter for a return of the
goods, based on bare possession in the vendee. Harrngton. v. King, 121
Mass. 269 (1876). And he may maintain trover although there is an
action pending against the defendant .by the vendor for trover. Adrzch
,V. Hodges, 164 Mass. 570, 42 N. E. 107 (1895). He may recover full
damages, but will hold the balance beyond his own interest in trust
for the vendor. Caroline C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Unaka Sprzngs Lbr Co., 130
Tenn. 354, 170 S. W 591 (1914) Where the conditional vendee of a
horse recovered $80.00 from the railway company which killed it, and
bought another horse for $60.00, it was held that the vendor had an action
for money had and received but no specific lien, and the new horse was
entirely the property of the vendee. Smith, v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So.
717 (1895). Where -the defendant damaged the car while in the hands of
the conditional vendee and the vendor (plaintiff) notified all parties of
his claim the defendant thereafter made a compromise settlement with
the vendee and it was held that, since the vendee could have recovered
full damages, he had power to make a fair settlement of his claim and
thereby bar the vendor. Ellis Motor Co. v. Hancock, 145 S. E. 518 (1928).
A release by the vendee, made in good faith, is a bar to an action by
the vendor. Harris v. Seaboard, Ar L ne Railwag Co., 190 N. C. 480, 130
S. E. 319, 46 A. L. P 1452 and 1458 (1925) However, it has been held
that a conditional vendee in default at the time of the conversion cannot
maintain trover where the vendor has made an election to forfeit by
making a demand on the defendant for the return of the property. Landrey
v. Mandelston., 109 Me. 376, 84 Atl. 642 (1912). See also Lacey 'U. Great
No. By. Co., 70 Mont. 346, 225 Pac. 808, 38 A. L. R. 1331 (1924).
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case of an action for damages 1 50 and in another case where the
question of intervening forfeiture was not involved. 151
VENDoR's ELEcTION OF RmEEws
Frequent reference has been made to the conditional vendor's
mutually exclusive remedies where the vendee defaults. The ques-
tion of what the vendor may do toward asserting one right without
losing the right to pursue the other has been a fruitful source of
litigation.
An action for the entire unpaid balance, obviously is an elec-
tion.1512 It is not so apparent that an action for intermediate pay-
ments should constitute such election. In fact, in conditional sales
of realty an action for intermediate installments is held not to bar
a forfeiture for subsequent default, although if forfeiture is de-
clared before judgment is obtained in such an action for an install-
ment, the forfeiture is a bar to further proceedings. 3 The effect
given to such forfeiture would seem to be at variance with the
usual rule that the rights of the parties to an action are to be de-
ternnned as of the date when proceedings are instituted. But the
holding that when an installment is due its payment, whether made
voluntarily or involuntarily, does not bar forfeiture for subsequent
defaults, is strictly logical. This is particularly sound in view of
the holding that a note or other evidence of obligation given for
prior payments, is collectible even after forfeiture if, and only if,
the vendor does not retain the right to forfeit the contract for the
non-payment of such note when due. T1 4 The bringing of the action
for such installment would take it out of the class of obligations for
the non-payment of which forfeiture would be allowed.
There is a rule that a note given for an antecedent debt, owed
by the maker to the payee, is presumptively given as collateral
security and not in discharge of the obligation ;55 and for this
reason, when a vendor takes the vendee's note for a part of the
purchase price, more especially if it be for other than the down
"' Helf v. Hansen & Keller Truck Co., note 143, supra.
21 Demtr v. Sorrenson, note 146, supra.212Flynn v. Gardord Motor Truck Co., note 58, supra, Ramey v. Smith.
56 Wash. 604, 106 Pac. 160 (1910). But a mere request for payment is
not an election which bars repossession. Com. Cr Co. v. Nat. Cr Co., note
11, supra.1
" Rose -v. Rundall, 86 Wash. 422, 150 Pac. 614 (1915).
'"Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279 Pac. 395 (1929).
For cases showing what evidence would be acceptable to prove that the
note was taken in payment, see Rathke v. Dexter Horton Nat'l Bank, 161
Wash. 434, 297 Pac. 181 (1931) Norman v. Meeker 91 Wash. 534, 158
Pac. 78 (1916) Vickerman -v. Kapp, 167 Wash. 464, 9 Pac. (2d) 793
(1932).
"1Blenz v. Fogle, 127 Wash. 224, 220 Pac. 790 (1923).
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payment, if he desires to be in a position to collect after a declara-
tion of forfeiture, he should be careful that it is understood that
the note is taken in payment and that the contract can not be for-
feited for its non-payment.
Whatever the merit of the above reasoning the Supreme Court
has enunciated a different rule in the case of chattels. An action
for intermediate installments on a conditional sale contract is held
to constitute an election, and thereafter the vendor cannot forfeit
the contract and repossess the chattel.156
No case has been noticed in winch the court has commented on
the variation in holding between the personalty and realty con-
tracts.
If the vendor accepts a mortgage on the subject matter of the
sale, he is estopped from asserting a retained title, even though
the mortgage was given to a trustee.15' If the purchase money is
represented by negotiable notes a transfer of the notes is an elec-
tion which vests title in the vendee,1 8 and this is true even though
they are only pledged as collateral security and later redeemed. 59
However, where the vendee was in default, and gave notes to
enable the vendor to raise money, which he did by negotiating the
notes, after the last note was paid he was permitted to declare a
forfeiture for a subsequent default on the grounds that there was
no understanding by either party that this was to prevent a for-
feiture.18 0 Perhaps the fact that the vendee knew the purpose to
wnch the notes were to be put would justify the reference that
they were taken as payment leaving the vendor no right to forfeit
the contract for their non-payment. An interesting feature of the
case is the court's generalization that the parties may have such
dealings as they see fit without constituting an election if the
parties so understand.
If the vendor files a claim against the estate of the vendee, de-
ceased, and the claim is allowed, he may not thereafter repossess
the car. 1 ' But apparently if he were mistaken as to his right to
1 8 Eilers Muesic House v. Douglass, note 12, supra, Kenworth sales Co.
v. Ralantino, 154 Wash. 236, 281 Pac. 996 (1929).
"'Hinchman v. Pt. Defiance Ru Co., 14 Wash. 349, 44 Pae. 867 (1896).
m MacLeod v. Aberdeen Brewing Co., 82 Wash. 74, 143 Pac. 440 (1914).
But if notes and mortgages are assigned together there is no election.
Western Electric Co. v. Norway etc. Co., 124 Wash. 49, 213 Pac. 686
(1923).
' Winton Motor Carrwge Co. v. Broadway Auto Co., 65 Wash. 650,
118 Pac. 817 (1911).
1 Barr v. Lloyd Co., 137 Wash. 490, 242 Pac. 1100 (1926).
KinbTle Motor Car Co. v. Androw, 125 Wash. 225, 215 Pac. 340
(1923).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
an allowance out of the estate, the filing of the claim would not be
an election.6 2
Where the vendor combined in an action of replevin a demand
for a judgment for the balance due, he was allowed to elect to stand
on replevin when the case came on for trial.168 And title will not
vest in the vendee merely because the vendor has failed to perform
in full his part of the contract.'6
It remains to consider cases involving an election to forfeit the
contract which arise on a subsequent attempt of the vendor to
enforce payment.
An action in replevin is an election which cancels the vendee's
obligation to make further payment. 5 An offer by the vendor to
sell a soda fountain to one who had purchased a store from the
conditional sale vendee, together with subsequent packing of it for
reshipment to the vendor's warehouse, was held to be an election
to forfeit-the court said rescind-and was a bar to an action
against the vendee's purchaser who otherwise would have been
liable for the amount due to failure to comply with the require-
ments of the Bulk Sales Act. 6 6 Actually taking possession of the
chattel is an election.6 7 Although a stipulation in the contract for
both remedies renders it a mortgage, by a subsequent agreement,
in part implied, the vendor may be made the agent of the vendee
to sell the chattel, and may thereafter hold the vendee for the de-
ficiency 168
Where the vendor's assignee consents to the vendor's repossess-
ing the chattel for his own protection, this is not an election by the
assignee to take the property which would waive his rights to hold
the vendor on his contract of guaranty6 6
GENERAL
The merchant of old transacted business on the basis of general
credit. He confined his business to business men of established
credit ratings or to the members of his community with whose
character, habits, means and movements he was personally familiar.
The great growth of population and the tendency to shift from
place to place, together with the phenomenal development of in-
stallment selling has forced the merchant of today to rely increas-
""Morgan Organ Co. v. Armour note 44, supra.
"I Carabin v. Wilhelm, note 123, supra.
16 Kohler & Chase v. Turner 84 Wash. 192, 146 Pac. 393 (1915).
165 Jordon v. Peek, note 41, supra, Thompson v. Murphzne, 79 Wash.
672, 140 Pac. 1073 (1914).
1 Stewart-Homes Drug Co. v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 133 Pac. 577 (1913).
16 Jones-Short Motor Co. 1). Bolin, note 154, supra.
'Jones v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 371, 88 Pac. 577 (1907).
11 ales Paper Co. v. Bortner 142 Wash. 81, 252 Pac. 539 (1927).
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ingly upon security devices. No method can be formulated which
will totally eliminate the hazards of such sales. Courts and legis-
latures, moved by a social consciousness of revolutionary economic
change, have paternalistically limited security devices to a nar-
rower range than fertile imagination and entire freedom of con-
tract would have devised. The legal history of the controversies
which have arisen is an aid to both seller and.buyer m making hi
selection. Where the circumstances are such that neither the ven-
dor's option to convert the sale into one on general credit, nor the
mortgagee's right to a deficiency judgment is of controlling conse-
quence, the summary character of the remedy or the facility of
operation must determine the choice. The profitableness of for-
feitures is probably more imaginary than real. The statute offers
the mortgagee a remedy scarcely less summary than the vendor's
claun and recovery The recording statutes require of the condi-
tional vendor less constant attention to preserve his protection than
they do of the mortgagee. This may be of great importance if the
subject matter is of a readily movable character, and tends to be of
lesser moment as the chattel approaches the character of a fixture.
From the purchaser's point of view the mortgage gives him
greater assurance that he will receive the benefit of Ins investment
should he become financially embarrassed, while in practice, though
not in theory, the position of the conditional vendee tends to ap-
proximate the layman's conception that it is at all times ins privi-
lege to choose whether he will proceed with the purchase or sur-
render the chattel and be relieved of further liability
SUGGESTIONS FOR A ColmposrrE ACT
Neither of the Uniform Acts, dealing with Conditional Sales or
Chattel Mortgages, has been adopted in'the State of Washington.
The Chattel Mortgage Act was finally approved by the Commig-
sioners in 1926. In the eight years since that time no state has
adopted either the Chattel Mortgage Act or the Conditional Sales
Act, unless it has been done late tns year. Eight states and Alaska
had previously passed the Conditional Sales Act.
There is a noticeable similarity between the two acts ina number
of particulars. The Conditional Sales Act frankly adopts a chattel
mortgage theory and permits the vendor in any case to resell the
chattel and hold the vendee for a deficiency, if any A sale is re-
qmred if fifty per cent of the purchase price has been paid, and the
vendee may require it in any case, although the Commissioners
found as a practical matter that he received little benefit from a
sale if less than fifty per cent had been paid. If over $500 has
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been paid, notice by publication is required. Redemption is pro-
vided for but if the vendor gives the vendee between twenty and
forty days notice that he intends to retake the property, he may
then proceed to sell the property immediately after taking it with-
out -delay except as to requirements for advertising, unless the
vendee perform the defaulted obligations before that time.17 0
The Chattel Mortgage Act provides a similar foreclosure pro-
cedure, it being provided that redemption may be barred by notice
of twenty days of intention to retake possession, after which the
mortgagee may proceed to sell in the manner provided by law for
the seller having a seller's lien. If no such notice is given sale must
be delayed for a ten day redemption period. If the mortgagee re-
ceives a written notice from the mortgagor that he believes the
property is worth $500 or more notice by publication is required.
Ordinary court process of foreclosure is also provided at the option
of the mortgagee."-'
Under either act if an actual sale is made the obligor is entitled
to the surplus, if any
Both acts contemplate that the vendor or mortgagee shall take
possession on default, if it can be done without breach of the
peace.
Both acts provide in the case of chattels attached to, but sever
able without material injury from, realty, for filing notice in the
manner required for an instrument affecting real property 172
Neither instrument requires an acknowledgment, but the Chattel
Mortgage Act requires two witnesses of the mortgagor's signature
and if an acknowledgment is made it creates a presumption of due
execution. However, no affidavit of good faith is required. Its
draftsman, Professor Llewellyn, as heretofore mentioned, was un-
able to find any record of a prosecution for a false affidavit, not-
withstanding that many fraudulent mortgages have been given.
The Act provides a penalty for the giving of a fraudulent mort-
gage. 73
The conditional sale is valid as to all parties if filed within ten
days of delivery of possession, as is now the case in Washington.
But the chattel mortgage makes filing constructive notice only from
the time of actual filing.1
7 4
,70 Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Sec. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22.
I Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act. Sec. 55, 57, 58, 61.1 72Cond. Sale 64. Ch. Mtg. See. 41.
17, Cond. Sale, See. 5. Ch. Mtg. Sec. 9, 43, 52.
I" Cond. Sale, Sec. 5. Ch. Mtg. Sec. 35.
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Both acts limit the effect of the original filing to three years, and
provide for repeated renewals of one year each upon refiling with
a statement of the account.1 7 5
A conditional sale is to be filed in the county where the chattels
are to be kept, a chattel mortgage in the county where they are lo-
cated, and also in the county where the mortgagor resides. 76
Both acts provide for refiling in the district to winch the goods
are removed within ten days after notice of such removal, the obli-
gor being required to give such notice. The Chattel Mortgage Act
also provides that the instrument is invalid as to certain parties if
it is not reified within six months after such removal regardless of
notice.
17 7
In view of the many similarities, some of which have been men-
tioned above, the writer believes that the legal profession might
well consider, before accepting either act, the possibilities of a com-
posite act covering the entire field of personal property security,
with the possible exception of the trust receipt. Such an act should
abandon the concept of the preservation of two parallel develop-
ments winch under the Uniform Acts have become so nearly the
same. It should, however, recognize any real social or economic
interest and make any necessary special provision.
It would have the advantage of a single filing system. A party
examining the records is primarily interested in whether any se-
curity interest has been reserved rather than whether one or the
other kind of claim constitutes a lien upon the property It might
be possible to provide for tins feature even if separate acts were
adopted.
Where the remedies are so nearly the same and eliminate the
harshness of the strict forfeiture upon the vendee while committing
him to the obligation of a deficiency judgment, it would seem that
the social and economic reasons winch properly have impelled the
courts to draw so fine a distinction between the two types of se-
curity and the parties entitled to use them, no longer would exist.
A composite act would eliminate a considerable amount of litiga-
tion upon such questions.
The following are offered as tentative provisions, expressed in
general language, and not in definitive form.
1. The filing of a security instrument shall constitute construe-
17 Cond. Sale, See. 11. Ch. Mtg. Sec. 48.
116 Cond. Sale, Sec. 51. Ch. Mtg. Sec. 36.
7 Cond. Sale, See. 13, 14. Ch. Mtg. sec. 37, 35.
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tive notice only from the date of filing, provided that if the instru-
ment affirmatively shows that it is given to secure the payment of
the purchase money, whether it is payable to the vendor or the
party who advanced the purchase money, and is accompanied by
an- actual change of possession, it shall be valid as against all
parties if it is filed within ten days of such delivery of possession.
2. The original filing of a security instrument shall be m the
county where the chattel is located, provided that if given to secure
the payment of purchase money it shall be filed m the county
where by the terms of the instrument the chattel is to be kept. In
either case it shall also be filed in the county where the obligor re-
sides.
3. The obligor of a security instrument shall give to the obligee
written notice of an intention to remove the chattel from the county
at least ten days before such removal, unless such removal is for
temporary purposes and for a duration of not over thirty days.
4. To constitute constructive notice to bona fide purchasers, en-
cumbrancers, or subsequent creditors, the instrument must be filed
in the county to which the chattel is removed within ten days after
actual notice of such removal, provided that in any event it shall
not constitute constructive notice to such parties unless filed within
thirty days after such removal.
5. The original filing of such security instrument shall cease to
be constructive notice three years after the date of filing, but it
may be repeatedly renewed for a period of one year by the filing
of the obligor's written statement of the balance due upon the
obligation.
6. The obligee shall be entitled to take possession upon twenty
days notice given to the obligor after default, if this can be done
without breach of the peace, unless the obligor before the expira-
tion of such period shall have performed the defaulted obligation,
and shall sell the chattel upon notice (as provided in this act) pro-
vided that if the instrument affirmatively shows that it was given
for purchase money, the obligee shall not be required to sell the
chattel unless either (a) Fifty per cent or more of the purchase
price has been paid, or (b) the obligor shall make written request
for such sale.
7 In any case if a sale is made, the obligor shall be entitled to
the surplus after deducting costs and the balance due, and unless
the instrument otherwise provide shall be liable for any deficiency
8. Where the chattels are delivered to or left in the possession
of the obligor who is a dealer in such chattels, the filing of the se-
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curity instrument shall not constitute constructive notice thereof to
bona fide purchasers from the obligor m the regular course of
business.
The idea of the last section is borrowed from the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, the others with slight modification from the other
two Uniform Acts. Obviously a number of other provisions, most
of which could be modeled after provisions of these Acts, would be
required for a completed act.
The Uniform Acts are exceptionally well prepared. If any fault
is to be found with them it is that they follow along traditional
lines in their separation of such security devices which are closely
related as a business matter. Possibly this was a necessary step in
their evolution. But a Composite Act could now be prepared
which would have obvious advantages over two separate statutes.
